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FERNANDEZ V. CALIFORNIA: CO-OCCUPANT CONSENT
SEARCHES AND THE CONTINUED EROSION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
ABSTRACT
Consent searches allow the police to search a residence without a
warrant when an occupant gives the police permission to do so. Howev-
er, the situation becomes complicated when multiple individuals live at a
residence and one of the residents allows the police to search over anoth-
er resident's objection. In the 2006 case, Georgia v. Randolph, the Su-
preme Court somewhat limited ability of authorities to conduct co-
occupant consent searches by declaring a search of a residence invalid
when the objector was both expressly objecting and physically present.
Justice Souter suggested in limiting dicta that a search would be invalid
if there was evidence that the police removed a suspect from the scene
for the purposes of avoiding a possible objection to a search. In the 2014
case, Fernandez v. California, the Court retreated from Souter's position,
holding a co-occupant consent search valid even when the police arrest
and remove the objector from the scene and then obtain consent from
another occupant. Writing for the Fernandez majority, Justice Alito de-
clared that as long as an officer's removal of the suspect from a crime
scene was objectively reasonable, the search is valid. No subjective in-
quiry into officer motivations is required.
This Comment criticizes Fernandez on three reasons. First, it argues
that Fernandez ignores the intention of the Fourth Amendment's drafters,
who wanted to limit the arbitrary and discretionary authority of law en-
forcement. Second, it argues that Fernandez further demonstrates the
inherently coercive nature of consent in consent-search cases. Finally, it
contends that Fernandez further weakens the Court's already inadequate
protections against potential police abuse in co-occupant consent-search
cases.
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INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" and ensures that
court warrants for such searches will not be issued "but upon probable
cause."' Early twentieth-century Fourth Amendment jurisprudence fo-
cused on the protection of defendants from warrantless searches, even
when a co-occupant consented to a search.2 By the middle of the century,
this protective stance evolved into the Court holding that warrantless
searches are "per se unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. In
Mincey v. Arizona,4 Justice Stewart even went so far as to declare that,
"the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can
never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment."
Since the early 1970s, however, the Supreme Court has slowly
eroded the Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless searches,
especially in cases involving third-party consent to enter a premises, to
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
2. See e.g., Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 316 (1921) (declaring a co-occupant con-
sent search of joint premises as being of "unconstitutional character"); see also George M. Dery, Ill
& Michael J. Hernandez, Blissful Ignorance? The Supreme Court s Signal to Police in Georgia v.
Randolph to Avoid Seeking Consent to Search from All Occupants of a Home, 40 CONN. L. REv. 53,
56 (2007).
3. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
4. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
5. Id. at 393.
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the extent that the exceptions have almost swallowed the original rule.6
In United States v. Matlock,7 the Court confirmed that consent of one co-
occupant to conduct a search was sufficient to give the police the power
to search the entire premises,8 and in Illinois v. Rodriguez,9 the Court
held that the police only needed to reasonably believe that a consenting
third party was an occupant, even if that belief was mistaken.'0
More recently in Georgia v. Randolph," the Court seemed to re-
store some constitutional protections when it held that a search is uncon-
stitutional if conducted over the clear objections of a physically present
co-occupant.12 The Court also recognized the possibility that its ruling
would give the police an incentive to simply remove potential objectors
from the scene before an objection is made in order to avoid needing a
warrant.13 Consequently, the majority suggested that a search is invalid if
there is evidence that the police removed a potential objector with the
goal of avoiding an objection.14
This Comment will consider the Court's most recent third-party
consent case, Fernandez v. California,15 which held that a search based
on third-party consent is valid even if the police removed a previously
present objecting party.16 Part I of this Comment briefly summarizes the
historical development of the Court's third-party consent-search juris-
prudence, starting with the early twentieth century. Part II summarizes
the facts and Court's holding in Fernandez, which allowed a warrantless
search of a home to stand when the police arrested the party objecting to
the search and then obtained consent from the objector's live-in girl-
friend. Part III criticizes the precedent set by Fernandez on three inde-
pendent grounds: First, Fernandez, like other recent consent-search cas-
es, ignores the Framers' original Fourth Amendment intent and perverts
that intent by giving the police the discretion to override an objector by
simply removing him from the scene. 17 Second, Fernandez largely ig-
nores the coercive power that consent searches inherently create for the
police. Third, Fernandez further exacerbates the incentives that the po-
lice already have to manipulate citizens in order to conduct a warrantless
6. Marc McAllister, What the High Court Giveth the Lower Courts Taketh Away: How to
Prevent Undue Scrutiny of Police Officer Motivations Without Eroding Randolph 's Heightened
Fourth Amendment Protections, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 663, 664 (2008).
7. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
8. Id. at 170.
9. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
10. Id. at 185.
11. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
12. Id. at 122-23.
13. See id. at l21.
14. Id.
15. 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014).
16. Id. at 1134.
17. Id. at 1134-35.
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search. This Comment concludes by briefly suggesting eliminating con-
sent searches altogether as a solution to the issues discussed in Part III.
I. BACKGROUND
Over the past century, the Supreme Court's position on warrantless
searches authorized by a third party who also occupies the searched
premises has evolved from rejection of such searches to near universal
acceptance today.'8 In the early 1900s, the Court prioritized the privacy
of defendants over searches authorized by third parties. For example, in
Amos v. United States,'9 the defendant's wife consented to a search of
their home when asked by government officers.2 0 During the search, the
officers found illegal whiskey, yet the Court declared the search unlawful
because by the very nature of not having a warrant and requesting access
21to the home via the wife, the search implied coercion.
Two decades after Amos, the Court began to loosen its restrictions
on Fourth Amendment consent searches and began examining the volun-
22 2tariness of the search in each case. In Davis v. United States,23 the
Court upheld the warrantless search of a gas station, despite evidence
that the government agents told the defendant that he was required to
open the door and even tried to force a window open themselves.2 4 Ignor-
ing the evidence of possible government coercion, the Court held that the
search was valid because the defendant eventually consented.25 However,
as recently as the early 1960s, the Court intermittently employed a strict
application of the Fourth Amendment to third-party consent search cases,
as evidenced by Chapman v. United States26 and Stoner v. California,27
in which the Court refused to allow searches of rented premises based on
the consent of a landlord and hotel desk clerk respectively.28 In Stoner,
Justice Stewart noted that only the defendant himself could waive his
Fourth Amendment rights.29 The Court closed out the 1960s by adopting
an assumption of the risk-based approach in the third-party consent case
of Frazier v. Cupp.30 In Frazier, the defendant and his cousin were joint-
ly using a duffel bag for the storage of clothing.31 In the course of a mur-
18. See McAllister, supra note 6, at 664-65.
19. 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
20. Id. at 315.
21. Id. at 317.
22. See Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme
Court, 39 McGEORGE L. REV. 27,37 (2008).
23. 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
24. Id. at 586-87, 593-94.
25. Id. at 593.
26. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
27. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
28. See Dery & Hernandez, supra note 2, at 57-58 (summarizing the facts and holdings of
Chapman, 365 U.S. at 611-12, 616-18, and Stoner, 376 U.S. at 484-86, 488).
29. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489.




der investigation, the cousin consented to a police search of the bag,
which produced incriminating evidence against the defendant.32 The
Court upheld the admissibility of the evidence, reasoning that in sharing
the duffel bag, the defendant "assumed the risk" that his cousin would
grant someone else permission to search the bag.
The 1970s were a crucial decade in consent-search jurisprudence,
containing three landmark cases. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, a po-
lice officer requested and obtained permission to search a car during a
traffic stop.35 The central issue of the case revolved around whether the
police obtained voluntary consent for the search.36 In defining voluntari-
ness, the majority ultimately decided that it is "determined from all the
circumstances" surrounding the consent to search.37 Such circumstances
include subjective factors, such as the defendant's intelligence and
awareness of his rights, although no single factor, such as the awareness
of the right to refuse, is dispositive.38 However, the Court declined to
require an obligatory warning regarding consent searches, such as it did
with police interrogations and Miranda warnings, reasoning that unlike
the constitutional right to remain silent, the right to refuse a search is not
a constitutionally based right pertaining to the administration of a fair
trial.39
United States v. Matlock, decided in 1974, built on Frazier's as-
sumption of the risk logic for third-party consent cases.4 0 In Matlock,
police arrested the defendant in his front yard on suspicion of committing
bank robbery.4 1 The police subsequently asked for and received permis-
sion to search the house from the defendant's girlfriend, and upon
searching their shared bedroom, discovered evidence tying the defendant
to the robbery.42 Holding that the search was valid, the Court declared
searches permissible if "permission to search was obtained from a third
party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relation-
ship to the premises."3 Explaining its rationale in a footnote, the Court
reasoned that co-occupants essentially assume the risk that their house-
mates may allow a search."
32. Id. at 732, 740.
33. Id. at 740.
34. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
35. Id at 220.
36. Id at 223.
37. Id at 248-49.
38. Id. at 226.
39. Id. at 232, 237.
40. Maclin, supra note 22, at 45.
41. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166 (1974).
42. Id
43. Id. at 171.
44. Id. at 171 n.7 (recognizing that common authority to grant a search rests on the "mutual
use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is
2015] 403
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A decade later in 1990, Illinois v. Rodriguez drastically expanded
the holding of Matlock by allowing a search even if the police mistakenly
believed a third party actually had the authority to consent to such a
search when the party in fact did not.45 In Rodriguez, the police arrested
defendant Rodriguez in his own apartment and subsequently seized drug
paraphernalia after Ms. Fischer, who referred to the location as "our"
apartment, granted them access.46 However, Rodriguez contended that
Ms. Fischer did not have authority to consent to a search because Ms.
Fischer had moved out a few weeks prior and was not on the lease.47 In
holding the search valid, Justice Scalia adopted a reasonableness test that
dictated that Fourth Amendment consent searches do not actually require
"factual accuracy," but only require that an officer's actions "always be
reasonable."4 8 Therefore, the law merely requires that the government's
actions were reasonable when evaluating whether a third party has con-
sented to a warrantless search of co-occupied premises.49
The final major co-occupant consent-search case preceding Fernan-
dez is Georgia v. Randolph, in which the Supreme Court attempted to
rein in some of its prior rulings.so In Randolph, the police were interven-
ing in a domestic dispute when they asked for defendant, Scott Ran-
dolph's, permission to search his house after accusations from his wife
regarding "drug evidence" in the house.' Mr. Randolph refused, so the
police then sought permission from Mrs. Randolph, who consented and
admitted the police into the house, where the police found incriminating
evidence against Mr. Randolph.52 Invalidating the search on both social
and legal norms,53 the Court issued a narrow rule declaring that "a war-
rantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal
of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified" based
solely on a co-occupant's consent.54 Fearing, however, that the police
may abuse the Court's new rule by simply removing potential objectors
from the scene, the majority wrapped up a "loose end" by noting in dicta
that there cannot be any evidence that the police removed the potentially
objecting party solely for the purpose of avoiding an objection.55
reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his
own right and that the others have assumed th[at] risk").
45. 497 U.S. 177, 183-88 (1990); see also McAllister, supra note 6, at 665.
46. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id at 180.
48. Id at 185.
49. Maclin, supra note 22, at 69.
50. 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006).
51. Id at 107 (internal quotation mark omitted).
52. Id
53. Dery & Hernandez, supra note 2, at 72.
54. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120.
55. McAllister, supra note 6, at 666 (quoting and explaining Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120-22)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Through its narrow holding in Fernandez, the Court refined the
Randolph holding, furthering the potential for police abuse, and ignoring
the intent of the Founding Fathers.
II. FERNANDEZ V. CALIFORNIA
This section discusses the 2014 case of Fernandez v. California.
Part A reviews the facts and procedural history of the case. Parts B
through D examine the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
A. Facts and Procedural History
In October 2009, Walter Fernandez and four of his associates
mugged Abel Lopez, kicking him and stealing $400, his wallet, and cel-
lular phone.57 Two members of the Los Angeles Police Department ar-
rived to investigate.58 A man then tipped off the officers that Fernandez
was in a nearby apartment, and the officers subsequently heard the
sounds of an altercation coming from the apartment.59 The officers
knocked on the door of the apartment and Roxanne Rojas appeared,
demonstrating visible signs of a possible beating, including a bloody
shirt and injured hand.6 One of the officers requested permission to do a
protective sweep of the premises, and upon the officer's request, Fernan-
dez came to the door, stating, "You don't have any right to come in
here."61 Based on the suspected assault against Rojas, the officers re-
moved Fernandez, placed him under arrest, and transported him to the
62
police station.
Roughly one hour after Fernandez's arrest, the officers returned to
the apartment and received both written and oral consent from Rojas to
search the dwelling.6 3 During the course of the search, the police discov-
ered "gang paraphernalia, a butterfly knife, [and] clothing worn by the
robbery suspect," as well as an illegally sawed-off shotgun.6" Authorities
subsequently charged Fernandez with, among other things, robbery, pos-
session of a firearm by a felon, possession of a short-barreled shotgun,
and infliction of corporal injury.6 5
The trial court denied Fernandez's motion to suppress the evidence
66
from the apartment. Fernandez was subsequently convicted of robbery
56. See infra text accompanying notes 101-195 for a discussion of the Court's use of original-
ism in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.




61. Id (internal quotation mark omitted).
62. Id
63. Id. at 1130-31.
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and infliction of corporal injury.67 California's Court of Appeal affirmed,
the Supreme Court of California declined to review the case, and the
United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.68
B. Majority Opinion
Justice Alito authored the majority opinion.69 Chief Justice Roberts,
as well as Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer joined him. 70
The Supreme Court affirmed the California Court of Appeal's ruling,
refusing to extend the protections of Randolph to Fernandez's situation.
The Court began by recognizing that consent searches are a permissible
category of warrantless searches under the Fourth Amendment, reason-
ing that property owners may want to clear their names and obtaining
needless warrants inconveniences all involved parties.72
The majority opinion then reviewed the Court's previous third-party
consent jurisprudence, including Matlock, Rodriguez, and Randolph,73
taking care to emphasize that a co-occupant third party may consent to a
search unless the objecting party is (1) physically present and (2) ex-
pressly objecting.74 Justice Alito emphasized how "[t]he Court's opinion
[in Randolph] went to great lengths to make clear that its holding was
limited to situations in which the objecting occupant is present."7 5 He
also emphasized the xtent to which the Court limited Randolph to situa-
tions where a person is both objecting and present by noting that "[t]he
Court's opinion could hardly have been clearer on [physical presence]."76
Justice Alito then rejected Fernandez's two main arguments.77 First,
he rejected the claim that because the police caused the objector's ab-
sence, the absence was irrelevant.78 Interpreting Justice Breyer's protec-
tions in Randolph as merely a test of the objective reasonableness of the
officers' conduct of removing the objector-as opposed to a subjective
inquiry into the officers' motivations-Justice Alito dismissed Fernan-
dez's claim because Fernandez never contested the reasonableness of the
police removing him from the scene.7 9 Accordingly, the majority ulti-
mately held that an objecting occupant, who is removed by the police
because of a "lawful detention or arrest," has no more Fourth Amend-
ment protection against a co-occupant authorized search than an objector
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1129.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1130,1137.
72. Id.at1132.
73. Id. at 1132-34.








absent for any other reason.80 Justice Alito also rejected the argument
that Fernandez's objection to the search did not expire, reasoning that
allowing objections to extend indeterminately into the future violates
social expectations and creates practical complications such as extending
objections for years if a party is absent due to incarceration.' Justice
Alito further noted that allowing indefinite objections creates procedural
issues for determining the scope of continuing objections and burdens
law enforcement operations.82 At no point in the course of the opinion
did the majority consider the history behind the Fourth Amendment or
the intent of the Framers.
C. Concurring Opinions
In a nod to his originalist leanings, Justice Scalia's brief concurring
opinion framed the issue using concepts from property law property
law.8 3 He noted that if traditional property law had dictated that Rojas
could not admit a guest to the joint premises over Fernandez's objec-
tions, then the case would not be as clear-cut.84 However, because tradi-
tional property law does not establish the above scenario as trespassing,
the police did not infringe on any of Fernandez's property rights.85
Justice Thomas used his short concurring opinion to express his
view that a consent searches are actually outside the scope of Fourth
Amendment searches because a consent searches are voluntary.86 Justice
Thomas reasoned that if a person authorized to give consent provides it,
then a warrantless search is permissible.87 Co-occupants such as Rojas
are authorized to give consent to search a shared residence because Fer-
nandez assumed the risk that she would allow a search of the premises.
88
D. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, devoted significant consideration to em-
phasizing how the current Court deviated from previous precedent.8
9
Noting how the Court previously declared warrantless searches "per se
80. Id.
81. Id.at1135-36.
82. Id. at 1136-37.
83. For more on the Court's (and especially Justice Scalia's) recent trend of deciding Fourth
Amendment cases on the basis of property law, see David C. Roth, Comment, Florida v. Jardines:
Trespassing on the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 91 DENV. U. L. REv. 551, 556, 560-63
(2014) (discussing how the Court insufficiently based its decision in Flordia v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct.
1409 (2013) solely on property law and should have taken a privacy-based approach as well).
84. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 137-38 (Scalia, J., concurring).
85. Id.
86. Id at 1138 (Thomas, J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1138-41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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unreasonable,"90 Justice Ginsburg compared the facts in Fernandez to
those in Randolph, stressing that, like the objector in Randolph, Fernan-
dez was actually present at the time he made his objection.91 The dissent
argued that Randolph in no way suggested that a previously present ob-
jector's request "could be ignored if the police reappeared post the objec-
tor's arrest."92
The dissent also objected to the social expectations reasoning em-
ployed in Randolph and carried through into Fernandez by noting how
the police "have power no private person enjoys."93 Even if a co-
occupant has the power to admit a social guest over a housemate's objec-
tion, unlike a social guest, the police have the power to arrest individuals
and remove them from the house.94 Justice Ginsburg then criticized the
"practical problems" that the majority imagined by extending Randolph
protections indefinitely into the future95 For example, if an objecting
party is incarcerated, getting an actual search warrant should not be diffi-
cult and would solve the problem of an inmate withholding consent to
search a residence.96 Additionally, obtaining search warrants in the mod-
ern world is now an efficient process due to modern technology, so war-
rants do not represent the burden on law enforcement that they once
did.9 7 Lastly, the dissent invoked the intent of the Constitution's Framers,
noting that the law should require warrants because "the Framers saw the
neutral magistrate as an essential part of the criminal process shielding
all of us, good or bad, saint or sinner, from unchecked police activity."9 8
III. ANALYSIS
The Court set an unfortunate precedent in Fernandez because it fur-
ther removed consent-search jurisprudence from the Framers' underlying
intent of the Fourth Amendment. In doing so, the Court also worsened
the perverse incentives created in Randolph for the police to use their
discretionary and coercive power to manipulate situations in order to
conduct warrantless searches.
A. Fernandez Continues the Trend ofIgnoring the Framers' Fourth
Amendment Intent
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has not given significant con-
sideration to the intent of the Founding Fathers or the history behind the
90. Id. at 1139 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id at 1139-40.
92. Id. at 1140.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1141 (internal quotation mark omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1142.
98. Id. at 1143.
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Fourth Amendment.99 In those rare instances when the Court has used
history as a guide, it has done so inconsistently.' The Court's neglect of
the Framers' intent is particularly noteworthy given that two of the
Court's current Justices have strong originalist leanings.'o' The Fernan-
dez Court's neglect of history has given the police the discretionary abil-
ity to avoid warrants contrary to the Amendment's original intent, as
revealed through the lens of past Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
historical research surrounding the Amendment's drafting.
When the Court has used history to interpret the Amendment, it has
primarily taken two differing approaches. The first and earliest approach
involves interpreting the Amendment by discerning the general intent of
the Framers through the lens of the historical events that motivated
them.102 The second, more recent approach relies on a review of common
law at the time of the nation's founding.103 One of the most prominent
early examples of the Supreme Court's use of history and the Framers'
intent occurred in the late-nineteenth century case of Boyd v. United
States.1 0 In Boyd, the Court reviewed whether a forced production of a
person's private papers in the course of a customs investigation was an
unreasonable search or seizure as defined by the Fourth Amendment.05
In determining the answer, Justice Bradley, writing for the majority, ex-
amined the state of search and seizure law in both the colonies and Eng-
land in the mid- 1700s and analyzed how developments at that time influ-
enced America's Founding Fathers.'0 The Boyd Court paid particular
attention to how English authorities in the colonies issued writs of assis-
tance, which gave the English authorities a wide discretion to conduct
searches.1 07 The majority even quoted the famous eighteenth-century
Massachusetts lawyer, James Otis, 08 who declared that England's search
and seizure procedure was "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the
99. Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth
Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 896-97 (2002).
100. See id. (noting that during two Supreme Court terms during the early 2000s, the Court
decided eleven Fourth Amendment cases, yet only significantly analyzed history in one).
101. Maclin, supra note 22, at 27.
102. See infra notes 115-129 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 130-147 and accompanying text.
104. 116 U.S. 616 (1886); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2000).
105. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622.
106. Id. at 624-25.
107. Id.
108. James Otis was a prominent lawyer in Massachusetts during the mid 1700s. Otis graduat-
ed from Harvard College and was practicing law by the age of twenty-three. Otis was the Massachu-
setts Bay Colony's Acting Advocate General when he was asked to represent various merchants in
the Writs of Assistance case against the Crown. In order to argue the case, Otis had to give up his
position as Advocate General and even refused to take compensation from the merchants following
the case. See John M. Burkoff, "A Flame of Fire": The Fourth Amendment In Perilous Times, 74
Miss. L.J. 631, 635-38 (2004).
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most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of
law, that ever was found in an English law book."1 09
The Boyd opinion also paid homage to the prominent eighteenth-
century English case of Entick v. Carrington,110 in which Lord Camden
condemned the breaking open and seizure of the plaintiff's desk and per-
sonal papers as an unwarranted violation of a man's right to be secure in
his property.' In reaching the conclusion that the forced production of
the papers was unconstitutional, the Boyd Court asserted that the nation's
founders were surely familiar with the Lord Camden ruling and that Lord
Camden's propositions and language were on their minds as they drafted
the Fourth Amendment.12 Subsequent Supreme Court majorities and
dissents have relied on Boyd's analysis to justify their historical argu-
ments in Fourth Amendment cases.113
In the early twentieth century, Justice Brandeis authored what
would become a well-known dissent in Olmstead v. United States,l4 in
which the Justice contested the constitutionality of wiretapping a suspect
without a warrant.' 5 Drawing heavily on the approach used by Justice
Bradley in Boyd,l6 Justice Brandeis argued that the general intent of the
Framers was to provide for citizens "against the government, the right be
let alone."'"7 By the middle of the century, Justice Frankfurter took over
109. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625 (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Bradley also quoted
Founding Father John Adams, who referred to the Otis statement as "the first scene of the first act of
opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born."
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
110. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765); 19 How. St. Tr. 1029.
11. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626 (discussing the holding of Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807).
Justice Bradley quoted Lord Camden's opinion extensively, placing emphasis on the sections of the
opinion where Lord Camden emphasized how "[t]he great end for which men entered into society
was to secure their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances
where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole." Id at
627 (internal quotation mark omitted).
112. Id. at 626-27, 630.
113. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1965) (using Boyd to emphasize the
connection between the Founders' dislike of vague general warrants and the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 364-65 (1959) (referring to Boyd to justify the
holding on the constitutionality of a forced home health inspection); id. at 377 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (referring to Boyd to justify the position on the constitutionality of a forced home health inspec-
tion). But see Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1752-53 (questioning the historical validity of Justice
Bradley's analysis of intent in Boyd and declaring it "legal creativity" as opposed to "historical
scholarship").
114. 277. U.S. 438 (1928).
115. Id at 471-86 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
116. Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1740.
117. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Leading off his protest against ex-
pansive Fourth Amendment powers, Brandeis lamented how the Court has continually given Con-
gress power "over objects of which the [founding] fathers could not have dreamed." Id. at 472. The
majority in Olmstead had concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not protect against the wiretap
because the Amendment only protect against the search and seizure of "things," which voices over
an electronic telephone line decidedly were not. Id. at 464-66. No items were searched or seized and
"the evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only." Id The majority gave a
brief nod to history by examining some common law surrounding the exclusionary rule at the time of
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as the Court's leading proponent of using history and the Framers' intent
to interpret the Fourth Amendment.118 In a series of dissenting opinions,
Justice Frankfurter vigorously defended the Fourth Amendment's war-
rant requirement and sought to illuminate the general intent of the
Amendment as opposed to its intricate applications.'l9 In defending the
need for strong constitutional protections against warrantless or unlim-
ited searches, Justice Frankfurter noted how the Fourth Amendment was
a reflection of the Framers' own experience with an unchecked police
state and contended that the Amendment "was the answer of the Revolu-
tionary statesmen to the evils of searches without warrants and searches
with warrants unrestricted in scope."l20 Justice Frankfurter also analyzed
the intent of the Fourth Amendment in light of the state constitution that
the Founders modeled it after. 121 Given that the Fourth Amendment more
closely resembles the Massachusetts Constitution's protection against
"unreasonable" searches and seizures, as opposed to the Virginia Consti-
tution's more loosely worded language of simply opposing broad and
unlimited warrants, Justice Frankfurter concluded that Congress intended
to create sweeping protections against the government's ability to con-
duct searches and seizures. 122
Another revealing analysis of the Framers' original intent occurred
in Justice Douglas's dissent in the 1974 case of Matlock where, in a foot-
note, Douglas analyzed the history of the searches in the colonies that
motivated the creation of the Fourth Amendment.'2 3 The footnote sug-
gested that the Framers added the "unreasonable" requirement to the
searches and seizures language of the Amendment not to give courts
discretion to allow warrantless searches, but to strengthen the protections
of the Amendment.124 Paralleling the historical account given in earlier
the Fourth Amendment's passage, but only spent one sentence discussing why the Amendment was
necessary in the first place. See id. at 463.
118. Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1763.
119. See id. at 1763-64 (noting how Justice Frankfurter sought to examine exactly what prac-
tices most incensed the Founding Fathers in order to discern their intent); see also United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (contending that search and seizure
cases must be decided in the context "of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment").
120. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 69-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment "was a safeguard against recurrence of abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be
one of the potent causes of the Revolution"); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[W]e are in danger of forgetting that the Bill of Rights reflects experi-
ence with police excesses."); see also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 159 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) ("[The Fourth Amendment] sought to guard against an abuse that more than any one
single factor gave rise to American independence.").
121. Harris, 331 U.S. at 158 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 180 n.l (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also
Maclin, supra note 22, at 47.
124. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 180 n.l (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Framers added the first
clause to give additional protections to the people beyond the prescriptions for a valid warrant, and
not to give the judiciary carte blanche to later dilute the warrant requirement by sanctioning classes
of warrantless searches.").
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dissenting opinions by Justice Frankfurter, Justice Douglas supported his
arguments by elaborating in-depth how the colonists were subject to, and
detested, royally-issued "general warrant[s], . . . which gave the officials
of the Crown license to search all places and for everything in a given
place, limited only by their own discretion."'25 Justice Douglas subse-
quently explained how during Virginia's debate surrounding the Bill of
Rights, a proposed amendment limiting government searches clearly
presumed that unreasonable searches could only be avoided using a war-
rant. 126 When the First Congress convened and James Madison proposed
constitutional amendments, a fear of general warrants motivated a
searches and seizures amendment, as evidenced by the Fourth Amend-
ment's two distinct clauses.127 Justice Douglas contended that the history
of the Fourth Amendment's clause of "and no warrant shall issue" indi-
cates that it was "created in an effort to strengthen the prohibition of
searches without proper warrants and to broaden the protections against
unneeded invasions of individual privacy."1 28
The entire Court subsequently ignored history and the Framers' in-
tent in Fourth Amendment cases from the 1970s until the 1990s, when
the Court's originalist Justices, such as Justices Thomas and Scalia, be-
gan inconsistently examining the common law in place at the time of the
nation's founding in order to determine intent in some Fourth Amend-
ment cases.129 The Court's more recent emphasis on common law rules
has been the focus of criticism and is in stark contrast to the Court's ear-
lier approach that emphasized the general intent of the Amendment.'30
For example, in the 1995 case of Wilson v. Arkansas, a unani-
mous opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, the Court declared that the
police are required to knock and announce their presence when serving a
warrant under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness test.132 In arriv-
ing at that decision, the majority noted that the Court has "looked to the
traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afford-
ed by the common law at the time of the framing."' 33 The Court then
examined common law during colonial times and concluded that the
knock and announce rule was embedded in the early laws of the colo-
nies.'34 However, the Wilson Court then deviated from a pure historical
common law approach by announcing that there are exceptions to the
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. The two distinct clauses are "shall not be violated" and "no Warrants shall issue." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV; Matlock, 415 U.S. at 180 n.l (Douglas, J., dissenting).
128. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 180 n.l (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Maclin, supra note 99, at 895-96; Maclin, supra note 22, at 27.
130. See Maclin, supra note 99, at 897-98, 901; Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1744.
131. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
132. Id. at 929.
133. Id. at 931.
134. Id. at 933.
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knock and announce rule in the presence of "countervailing law en-
forcement interests."3 The Wilson Court arrived at this conclusion de-
spite the fact that there is significant evidence that prior to the Fourth
Amendment any exceptions to the knock and announce rule were ex-
tremely limited in scope and that colonial era scholars, and the English
courts, did not recognize any exceptions to the rule at all. 136 Essentially,
in Wilson, the Court selectively used common law to discern the Fram-
ers' intent when convenient and ignored common law when carving out
exceptions as the Court saw fit.137
The Court continued its inconsistent and seemingly contradictory
common law approach to the question of Fourth Amendment intent in
Wyoming v. Houghton,'38 which dealt with the question of whether a
warrantless search of a container in an automobile was in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.3 9 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia furthered
the doctrine of common-law review by stating that the Court would first
look at whether the search or seizure was legal at the time the Amend-
ment was ratified and, if that approach did not provide an answer, would
then look to other places.140 However, when it came time to evaluate
such common law, the Court found none and subsequently found the
search constitutional based on eighteenth-century federal legislation
granting warrantless searches of ships smuggling goods into the United
States, ignoring the distinction between ships crossing international bor-
ders and cars traversing within the interior of the country.141
The 2001 case of Atwater v. City ofLago Vista 42 demonstrates how
restricting an analysis of intent to the common law at the nation's birth
can create illogical results. In Atwater, the Court upheld the arrest of a
driver for a misdemeanor seatbelt infraction as a permissible seizure un-
der the Fourth Amendment.143 To support such a conclusion, Justice
Souter, writing for the majority, concluded that commentators disagree
on whether or not English common law traditionally forbade misde-
meanor arrests.'" The Court then examined other historical factors to try
to discern founding-era common law, such as the practices of colonial
135. Id. at 934.
136. Maclin, supra note 99, at 911-13 (discussing how there were incredibly few exceptions in
pre-Fourth Amendment American and English law to the knock and announce rule, including no
exceptions for officer safety and noting how efforts to legislate such exceptions in England repeated-
ly failed due to widespread resistance).
137. See id. at 911-912; see also Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1770 (noting the tendency of
Supreme Court justices, regardless of their interpretive method, to find the Framers' views as incred-
ibly similar to their own).
138. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
139. Id. at 297.
140. Id. at 297, 299-300.
141. Maclin, supra note 99, at 924-25; Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1760.
142. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
143. Id. at 323-24, 354.
144. Id. at 322, 332.
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state legislatures.145 Additionally, to support its assertion of the correct
interpretation of common law and the Framers' views, the Court cited the
acts of the very parliament that the colonists rebelled against, stating that,
"throughout the period leading up to the framing, Parliament repeatedly
extended warrantless arrest power to cover misdemeanor-level offens-
es."l46 The absurdity of this approach is apparent. Although the Founders
surely intended to preserve many of the rights that they had as British
subjects, it is illogical to conclude with any certainty that they intended
to enshrine into American law many of the oppressive statutory British
search and seizure practices that they were rebelling against.147
The best example of the contrast between the two historical ap-
proaches, and the case demonstrating that the general intent approach is
better at protecting the rights of citizens and projecting the Framers' in-
tent, is Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.148 In Acton, Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, upheld the constitutionality of a school district's
drug program that included mandatory participation for all student ath-
letes.149 Despite the fact that the athletes being tested were not necessari-
ly under suspicion for drug use, Justice Scalia first determined that there
"was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of
search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted," and
then applied a balancing test to determine that the district's interest in
preventing drug abuse outweighed the students' expectation of priva-
cy. 150 Rejecting Justice Scalia's contentions and writing for the dissent,
Justice O'Connor argued that the Framers certainly would have intended
to reject mass, suspicionless searches, despite the obvious lack of eight-
eenth-century common law addressing drug testing.' ' Supporting her
argument, Justice O'Connor pointed to the fact that the Founders were
most clearly against broad searches, such as general warrants or any oth-
er unrestrained intrusions and sought to eliminate such abuses.15 2 There
also was no historical evidence that the Framers would have preferred
blanket, mandated searches of everyone over the detested general war-
rants, which allowed officials to search arbitrarily at their discretion.i5 3
Therefore, the dissent's approach in Acton better reflected what is known
about the Framers' intent by casting the Fourth Amendment in broad
145. Id at 337.
146. Id at 334.
147. See Maclin, supra note 99, at 958-59, 962.
148. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
149. Id. at 648, 664-65.
150. Id. at 652-53, 661, 664-65.
151. Maclin, supra note 99, at 918-19.
152. Acton, 515 U.S. at 669-70 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153. Id at 670. In a parenthetical, O'Connor quoted an earlier dissent by Justice Rehnquist,
referring to the approval of blanket searches as the ."misery loves company theory' of the Fourth




terms, as opposed to simply dismissing the significance of history when
there is no eighteenth-century common law on point.154
The Court continued its trend of inconsistently using history and in-
tent in its recent consent-search jurisprudence, as neither Randolph nor
Fernandez attempt a significant discussion of the history surrounding the
Amendment or attempt to discern the Framers' intent in depth. Neverthe-
less, the Court has used the common-law approach as recently as 2013,
in Florida v. Jardines,15 5 in which the Court declared the use of a drug-
sniffing dog on the defendant's front porch to be an invalid warrantless
search.156 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia used a common-law
interpretation of the Amendment's intent, emphasizing the historic com-
mon-law focus on the sanctity of the home and expectations of priva-
15 7
Cy.
In recent years, scholars have examined the historic underpinnings
of the creation of the Fourth Amendment, and although their individual
conclusions about what the Amendment's history means for modem day
jurisprudence have differed somewhat, their historical accounts have
essentially been the same.'58 Such consistent accounts verify the history
behind the general intent approach to interpreting the Fourth Amend-
ment.159 Research indicates that the Fourth Amendment was significantly
influenced by Founding Father John Adams and resulted from a combi-
nation of early search and seizure jurisprudence as well as historical
events.160 English legislation dating back to 1662 authorized colonial
writs of assistance, which were essentially unlimited search warrants and
enabled customs officers to search where they pleased, without reason or
probable cause.' Early in John Adams's career, Adams observed the
1761 Writs ofAssistance case, in which prominent Massachusetts law-
yer, James Otis, argued against the renewal of the writs of assistance in
154. See Maclin, supra note 99, at 919-20.
155. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
156. Id. at 1413-16, 1417-18.
157. Id. at 1412, 1414-15.
158. Compare Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers' Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 989-1052 (2011) (discussing the works of John Adams as a means of
ascertaining the Framers' original intent), with Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 560-71 (1999) (arguing that some conventional accounts of
Fourth Amendment history, while useful, provide little assistance in determining when a warrant is
actually required), and Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012
SUP. CT. REV. 67, 70-73 (2012) (examining search and seizure cases at the time of the nation's
founding as a window into the Fourth Amendment), and Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the
Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 939-58 (1997) (reviewing how the
evolution of general searches and specific warrants in Colonial America influenced the inception of
the Fourth Amendment), and Maclin, supra note 99, at 959-61 (explaining how the Fourth Amend-
ment was a reaction to heavy-handed British search and seizure practices).
159. See supra note 158.
160. Clancy, supra note 158, at 979-8 1.
161. Id. at 991-92 (discussing the virtually unlimited scope of writs of assistance and noting
how that the informer who was authorized to do the searching under the writs was actually permitted
to keep a percentage of any illicit goods).
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the colonies.162 The historical record shows that during the course of the
argument Otis decried the writs as "plac[ing] the liberty of every man in
the hands of every petty officer" and warned that because a judge did not
review specific writs, individuals were subject to officials' "arbitrary
power."' During and following the case, Adams compiled first-hand
notes and a case abstract, which emphasized that the writs of assistance
"place[d] the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer,"
because the officers were "accountable to no person for [their] doings"
and violated the traditional notion of protecting a man's house as if it
were his castle.'6
The authorities' use of writs of assistance in Colonial America cre-
ated general hostility and is credited with directly starting the colonies
down the path to revolution and inspiring the Fourth Amendment.165 The
implementation of the Townshend Acts by the English Parliament further
authorized general writs of assistance in all of the colonies, creating addi-
tional hostility, as well as a rift between British officials and colonial
judges.'66 Colonial judges even refused to issue the writs, fearing even
more search and seizure discretion in the hands of English officials.' 67
Following the Townshend Acts, Adams represented the town of Boston
in opposing the seizure of fellow founder John Hancock's ship, arguing
that the seizure was unjustified due to lack of probable cause.i Based
on some of Adams's personal letters, Adams was also likely well-versed
in the contentious, and often conflicting, English search and seizure cases
of the time, such as the famous case of Wilkes v. Wood.16 9 In Wilkes,
Lord Camden170 criticized a general warrant authorizing the search of all
persons and places for the author of a supposedly treasonous paper, call-
ing the process "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." '
162. Id. at 992. The previous writs of assistance needed to be renewed because of the death of
the king. Id.
163. Davies, supra note 158, at 580-81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. Clancy, supra note 158, at 999-1000; see also Davies, supra note 158, at 602-03 (noting
how colonial figureheads such as John Dickerson, William Henry Drayton, and Samuel Adams also
specifically attacked arbitrary searches of private residences as particularly egregious).
165. Clancy, supra note 158, at 1002; Davies, supra note 158, at 566; see also Maclin, supra
note 99, at 960.
166. Maclin, supra note 99, at 961.
167. Davies, supra note 158, at 581-82.
168. Clancy, supra note 158, at 1019. Further emphasizing the hatred that seizures inspired in
the colonists, riots broke out in Boston following the seizure of Hancock's ship, forcing the British
to send in troops and led directly to the Boston Massacre. Interestingly, John Adams also represented
the British soldiers accused in the massacre. Id. at 1019-20.
169. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.).
170. At the time of the case, Lord Camden was known as Chief Justice Pratt, as he was not yet
a lord. Clancy, supra note 158, at 1007.
171. Id. at 1006-07, 1Ol (quoting and summarizing Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489
(K.B.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1800 (questioning
the usefulness of many English search and seizure cases, such as Wilkes, because the inconsistent
reasoning and holdings in many of the cases make them "amenable to any number of readings").
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Following the American Revolution, but prior to the adoption of the
United States Constitution, many states adopted their own constitu-
tions.172 Many state constitutions contained search and seizure sections
addressing general warrants, but John Adams, in drafting the Massachu-
setts Constitution, went a step further by incorporating language guaran-
teeing a citizen's right to be "secure" against "unreasonable" searches.7 3
Additionally, Adams clarified that any issued warrants must be specific
in nature and must follow certain legal formalities.174 Following the
adoption of the original provisions of the United States Constitution,
James Madison was tasked with drafting a search and seizures proposal,
which would become the Fourth Amendment.175 Madison modeled his
text after Adams's provision in the Massachusetts Constitution, including
the "unreasonable" provision and the clause requiring specific warrants,
with the only substantive change being the identification of "probable
cause" as a proper level of suspicion.176 In a speech to the House of Rep-
resentatives accompanying his draft, Madison clearly stated that his in-
tent was to ban general warrants.7 7
As the historical evidence shows, the Founding Fathers, including
Adams and Madison, did not simply intend to enshrine sometimes con-
tradictory English common-law into the Constitution, but desired to re-
spond to the abuses that the colonists experienced under general warrants
and writs of assistance to ensure that such abuses could not happen
again. 178 After all, if the Framers had merely wanted to continue with the
status quo of English common law regarding searches and seizures, an
amendment outlining the scope of search and seizures practices was not
needed. The mid-century opinions of Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter
comport with this historical analysis by emphasizing the historic right of
the people to be free from government interference and discretionary or
unchecked police authority.179
The Court's holding in Fernandez frustrates the Framers' original
intent and places the exact kind of discretion into the hands of law en-
forcement that the colonists themselves detested in the general warrants
and writs of assistance of the eighteenth-century. Much as general war-
rants and writs of assistance allowed British officials to conduct almost
172. Kerr, supra note 158, at 71.
173. Clancy, supra note 158, at 1028 (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. Id
175. Id. at 1045-47.
176. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Id at 1045-46.
178. See Maclin, supra note 99, at 962.
179. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69-70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Fourth Amendment "was a safeguard against recurrence of abuses so deeply felt by
the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution"); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 474-79
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 159 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
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limitless searches at their discretion, Fernandez gives the police broad
discretion to arrest or otherwise lawfully detain and remove an objecting
suspect, therefore avoiding the need for a warrant, simply because a con-
senting co-occupant is present. Additionally, Fernandez interpreted Ran-
dolph's limiting dicta, which made a subjective inquiry into officer moti-
vations so that the police could not remove an objector "for the sake of
avoiding a possible objection,"'80 as a mere reasonableness test.8 ' There-
fore, officers may now remove an objecting suspect from a crime scene
with the sole purpose of avoiding the warrant process, so long as the sus-
pect's detention was reasonable.'8 2 Giving the police such powerful dis-
cretion as to override the expressly stated objections of an occupant
merely by removing him from the scene, offends the Framers' desire to
protect individuals from invasions of their privacy.183 Because of the
elimination of a subjective inquiry into officer motivations in Fernandez,
the police may now at their discretion remove a suspect from a scene for
the sole purpose of obtaining a warrantless consent search and still be
within the law. This newfound discretion in the hands of police officers
draws a parallel to John Adams's summary of the Writs of Assistance
case, in which James Otis expressed his fear that an officer executing an
unrestricted warrant was "accountable to no person for his doings."18
The Fernandez ruling also ignores the Court's more recent com-
mon-law approach to the Fourth Amendment-which it applied as re-
cently as 2013 in Jardines-by emphasizing the traditional common law
importance of expectations of privacy in the sanctity of one's home.'85
Yet, the Fernandez majority disregards the traditional position that a
search of a home is a more serious matter deserving higher protection
than a search of other places and simply analyzes the search from the
lens of social expectations.186 Given that it was neither Fernandez's car
nor his place of business, but his actual, private residence that the police
searched, it is illogical that the majority opinion gave no mention to the
precedent it continued to apply a mere year earlier stressing the im-
portance of protecting the sanctity of the home from warrantless search-
180. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006).
181. See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1134 (2014) ("[T]he test [regarding an
officer's actions] is one of objective reasonableness . . . .").
182. Id. (stating that an officer's motivation does not void "objectively justifiable behavior
under the Fourth Amendment" (quoting Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (2011)) (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
183. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 180 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing
how the grammatical construction of the Amendment indicates how it was formed to "strengthen the
prohibition of searches without proper warrants and to broaden the protections against unneeded
invasions of individual privacy").
184. See Clancy, supra note 158, at 1000.
185. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) ("[W]hen it comes to the Fourth
Amendment, the home is first among equals. At the Amendment's 'very core' stands 'the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."'
(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
186. See Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at I135.
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es. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia tries to address this contradiction
with Jardines by noting how under a traditional common-law, property-
based approach to searches, a co-occupant would have been able to admit
a guest to the house over Fernandez's objection without the guest com-
mitting trespass. However, the Fernandez dissent noted the absurdity
of Scalia's argument by commenting how a normal houseguest does not
have the search and seizure powers of the police.'88
Applying the more useful, general intent oriented approach of
Fourth Amendment interpretation as Justice Frankfurter did in Davis v.
United States, the Court's developing body of consent search law be-
comes absurd.189 Justice Frankfurter noted that if the function of the
courts is to place limits on searches, then it is illogical that the Constitu-
tion was "meant to make it legally advantageous not to have a warrant,"
allowing the police to conduct more expansive and discretionary search-
es when given an occupant's consent as opposed to a court's directive.190
In Justice Frankfurter's view, consent searches were the very kind of
unchecked state intrusion into the lives of private citizens that the Fourth
Amendment intended to control.191 Justice Frankfurter's position is sup-
ported by the experiences of the Founders dating back to the Writs of
Assistance case, in which James Otis famously expressed such a fear that
officials unchecked by judges could become "petty tyrants." 92 The Fer-
nandez ruling creates such a potential by allowing the police to remove
objectors from the scene and then conduct a warrantless search anyway.
By simply removing an objecting individual from the premises via lawful
detention or arrest, the police can now rely on a co-occupant's consent
and conduct a more expansive search of the premises than if they sought
an actual warrant from a court. This incentivizes police officers to con-
duct warrantless consent-based searches over seeking a warrant and is
incompatible with the Fourth Amendment's general objective of protect-
ing against invasions of privacy and promoting a government of limited
powers. As Justice Brandeis argued in his dissent, the Fourth Amend-
ment is best understood as guaranteeing citizens the "right to be let
alone" and protecting the "privacy of the individual." 93 Justice Brande-
is's contentions about the intent of the Fourth Amendment are corrobo-
rated by the Founders' arguments against the unlimited discretion of
general warrants and writs of assistance.194 In the Fernandez holding, the
Supreme Court ignored such historical concerns by allowing the police
187. Id. at 1137-38 (Scalia, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 1140 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
189. Maclin, supra note 22, at 40-41 (discussing Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 595
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
190. Davis, 328 U.S. at 595 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
191. See Maclin, supra note 22, at 40-41.
192. See Clancy, supra note 158, at 993-94 (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. Maclin, supra note 22, at 13-14 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. See Maclin, supra note 99, at 959.
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the discretion to arrest an objector and conduct a search based on third-
party consent.
B. Fernandez Demonstrates How Even in Co-Occupant Consent Cases,
the Notion of "Consent" May Include Coercion from the Police
One of the primary questions concerning any sort of consent search
is why would a rational suspect, or for that matter anyone who cares
about and is living with a suspect,'9 5 consent to the search of premises in
which he knows that there is incriminating evidence?l9 6 Yet, despite al-
most certain self-incrimination, or incrimination of a close family mem-
ber or friend, individuals in such situations often consent to searches.197
In fact, consent searches are incredibly frequent, occurring tens of thou-
sands of times a year, and in a study of one city-albeit in the 1980s-an
estimated 98% of police searches were consent searches.'98 In Fernan-
dez, the defendant's girlfriend, Roxanne Rojas, was the one who gave the
officers permission to search the apartment after the police arrested Fer-
nandez.199 However, the current body of scholarly research on fear, hu-
man behavior, ignorance of the law, and race relations calls into question
200whether the police-either explicitly or implicitly-coerced Rojas.
Many commentators have observed that even under the most casual
and friendly encounters, most citizens would not feel free to deny a po-
lice officer's request because common sense dictates that it is unwise to
tell an officer no.201 This is because in the presence of "an imposing au-
thority figure," many people feel that they do not actually have a right to
refuse.202 Various studies and psychological research over the past sever-
al decades have demonstrated that individuals will tend to acquiesce to
195. This assumes that any co-occupant does not wish to see the suspect convicted for his or
her crimes. See infra text accompanying notes 239-45 for an in-depth discussion of this dynamic in
Fernandez.
196. John M. Burkoff, Search Me?, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1109, 1114 (2007).
197. As Professor John Burkoff, very bluntly, framed it in a hypothetical:
How much of an idiot-how stupid, moronic, imbecilic-would a person carrying a gram of
crack cocaine stashed in her underwear, for example, have to be to really consent-"freely and
voluntarily"-to being searched by a police officer, knowing full well that such a search would
result inevitably in the discovery of the cocaine and a subsequent arrest?
Id. Some courts have even acknowledged the illogical absurdity of consent searches, with a judge on
the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals expressing surprise that a defendant would freely consent to a
search of a room and box that he knew contained drugs. Id at 1128 (discussing United States v.
Heath, 58 F.3d 1271, 1276 (8th Cir. 1995) (McMillian, J., concurring)).
198. Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 214 n.8
(2002).
199. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1130 (2014).
200. See Nirej Sekhon, Willing Suspects and Docile Defendants: The Contradictory Role of
Consent in Criminal Procedure, 46 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 112 (2011) (discussing how a
person may allow a search for reasons such as "fear, ignorance, or folly"); Strauss, supra note 198,
at 213, 237 (discussing how most people will feel pressured into consenting to a search regardless of
how politely a police officer makes the request).
201. Strauss, supra note 198, at 236.
202. Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1114.
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apparent authority, even in the absence of overt coercion.203 For example,
in one study, researchers had actors make requests of strangers on the
street, dressed in business attire, a milkman's uniform, or a security
guard's uniform (without a weapon).20 When asking the subjects to pick
up trash, the security guard had an 82% success rate whereas the milk-
man and man in business attire had 64% and 36% success rates respec-
tively.205 When inconveniencing strangers by asking them to vacate a bus
stop that they were perfectly entitled to be standing at, the guard had a
56% success rate whereas the success rate of the others was roughly
20%.206 It is arguable that the above experiment is not applicable to con-
sent-search situations in which a party personally has something to
207lose. But as the bus stop experiment illustrates, people will defer to
those with apparent authority, such as a police officer, even where there
is inconvenience or harm to themselves.208
Studies also show that normal citizens are likely to interpret even
polite requests by authority figures such as police officers as com-
mands.209 This is because the police often command others, conditioning
the public to view any police request as an order.210 Even if an officer is
making a polite request, the subject of the request is likely to view the
politeness as "face-maintaining because the [subject] understands that
coercion may be used."211 Consequently, even when making polite re-
quests, officers will actually appear commanding to the average citizen
because a significant part of any command is conveyed via the status of
"the badge and gun."2 12 Additionally, racial minorities are more likely
than others to view police requests for a search as commands because,
due to the racial biases in law enforcement, failing to acquiesce can lead
to violent consequences.213 The impacts of consent searches on minori-
ties are particularly significant because the police are more likely to stop
minorities and ask for a search on account of their color.214
203. Id.
204. Strauss, supra note 198, at 238.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 238-39.
207. Id. at 239-40.
208. Id. Another prominent study demonstrating deference to authority is the famous Mil-
gram's experiment, in which a notably high number of adults were willing to deliver electric shocks
causing apparent pain to a victim at the command of an authority figure. See id at 236-38.
209. Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1115.
210. Id
211. Id
212. Id. See also Strauss, supra note 198, at 241, where Professor Strauss emphasizes how
"[i]n everyday life, demands are often phrased as polite requests," using a hypothetical of a boss
asking if his secretary would mind fetching some coffee. The command may have been phrased as a
polite request, but most secretaries would not feel comfortable refusing.
213. See Strauss, supra note 198, at 242-43 (noting how even some judges actually recognize
that minorities cannot refuse a search without the risk of being detained, attacked, or shot).
214. Id. at 244; see also id. at 214 n.9 (noting the disparate impact that bus and traffic stops
have on minorities).
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Last but not least, citizens may also consent to a search that they
would not otherwise consent to out of ignorance.2 15 A person could be-
lieve that they have no legal right to object to a search; that even with an
objection, the officer will conduct the search anyway; or that if they re-
fuse, the refusal itself will then give the officer the necessary legal suspi-
cion to conduct a search.2 16
Whether there is evidence of implicit coercion-such as fear, igno-
rance, or racial biases, or explicit coercion such as the implied use of
force or actual police misconduct-courts have traditionally been hesi-
tant to invalidate consent searches on the basis of coercion. One signifi-
cant consent-search case involving voluntariness is the 1973 case of
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.217 In Schneckloth, the Court denied a sus-
pect's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a consent search, hold-
ing that the voluntariness of a search is to be determined from "all the
circumstances."218 In reviewing the circumstances, courts may consider
numerous factors such as age, education, intelligence, whether the sus-
pect was detained, and whether there was prolonged or repeated ques-
tioning.219 The Court also declined to extend a Miranda v. Arizona220
type of warning to consent searches, reasoning that it would be im-
practical to impose such a warning informing suspects about their rights
and expressing concern that "[c]onsent searches are part of the standard
investigatory techniques of law enforcement agencies."222 Ultimately, the
Schneckloth Court seemed to be more concerned with protecting the abil-
ity of the police to conduct consent searches223 than with protecting the
rights of individuals to be free from the inherent psychological coercion
that occurs when the police request a search.224
In practice, Schneckloth has done little to protect the rights of sus-
pects as courts have rarely voided searches based on the totality of the
circumstances test.225 In a survey of hundreds of consent cases, courts
actually analyzed the Schneckloth factors such as age and intelligence in
215. Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1118.
216. Id
217. 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
218. Id at 219-20, 248-49.
219. Id at 226.
220. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
221. See id at 498-99 (holding that before a suspect in police custody may be interrogated,
they must be informed of their rights against self-incrimination). However, some question whether
Miranda warnings are actually effective at protecting defendants because police still have some
discretion as to how and when they give the warning. See Sekhon, supra note 200, at 126.
222. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231-32. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Marshall contended that
there is nothing impractical about a simple warning of the right to refuse at the time a consent search
is requested and argued that the Court was more concerned with protecting "the continued ability of
the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens." Id. at 286-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
223. Strauss, supra note 198, at 219-20.
224. See id at 236-40 (discussing the various studies demonstrating how individuals will defer
to authority figures); Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1115 (explaining how requests from authority
figures are often interpreted as demands).
225. Strauss, supra note 198, at 221-22.
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only a select few cases, and even when the court did analyze the factors,
it often found the search to be voluntary.226 In one instance, the D.C.
Circuit determined that a suspect's consent was valid despite the fact that
the suspect had psychological problems and an IQ of only 76.227 In an-
other case, the D.C. Circuit found that a suspect gave voluntary consent
despite the fact that he only had a tenth-grade education and was encir-
cled by several sizable officers at the time of consent.2 28 In the rare in-
stances that courts invalidated consent, it was often because of blatantly
coercive police misconduct such as making threats, depriving the suspect
of necessities, or falsely claiming that the police had the right to
search.229 Essentially, as long as the police do not grossly misbehave or
lie about having an actual warrant, the courts will seemingly rubber
stamp the suspect's consent, regardless of other extenuating circum-
stances.230
However, even in the face of overt police coercion or a show of
force, courts are sometimes hesitant to invalidate consent searches.231 For
example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found valid consent de-
spite the fact that a suspect consented to a search only following a situa-
tion in which officers, who had their guns drawn, arrested him lying on
the ground.232 In another case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals validat-
ed a suspect's consent, despite the fact that the consent occurred at gun-
point, because the suspect routinely had encounters with law enforce-
ment and therefore was less likely to be intimidated.233 The Supreme
Court validated the use of overt demonstrations of force in consent-
search cases in the 2002 case of United States v. Drayton.234 In Drayton,
the Court upheld the consent search of two individuals on a bus, even
though at the time of the search, officers stood at both the back and front
of the bus, implying to the average passenger that they might not be free
to leave.235 The Court reasoned that when an officer asks for and receives
consent, it "dispels inferences of coercion."236
Statistics confirm the courts' reluctance to invalidate consent
searches. In a survey of all the federal appellate cases involving criminal
consent search motions to suppress between 2005 and 2009, the defend-
226. Id. at 222-23.
227. Id at 223 (discussing United States v. Hall, 969 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
228. Id. at 224 (discussing United States v. Rodney, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
229. See id at 225.
230. Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1131.
231. See Strauss, supra note 198, at 226.
232. See id. (summarizing the holding of United States v. Espinosa-Orlando, 704 F.2d 507
(1 I th Cir. 1983)).
233. See Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1127 (summarizing the holding of United States v. Bar-
nett, 989 F.2d 546 (1st Cir. 1993)).
234. 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002).
235. Id. at 197-98, 207.
236. Id. at 207.
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ant prevailed in a mere 16 of 148 cases, an 11% success rate.237 It is not
surprising that the courts are hesitant to invalidate consent searches be-
cause consent searches are a significant tool in the law enforcement arse-
nal; and police forces even train their officers on how to talk their way
into receiving consent.238 Finally, as one scholar has pointed out, unlike
forced confessions, which are of dubious reliability, coerced searches
produce evidence that is just as concrete and reliable as uncoerced
searches, and therefore give courts an incentive to find them valid.239
Fernandez continues the trend of the Supreme Court downplaying
issues of coercion in consent-search cases. The Court brushed aside
claims made in Fernandez's brief that during the course of the encounter
between the police and Fernandez's girlfriend, Roxanne Rojas, an officer
stated that the investigation would "determine whether or not we take
your kids from you right now or not." 240 Such a statement is clearly a
serious threat when directed at any mother. In the majority opinion, Jus-
tice Alito dismissed the defendant's claim of overt coercion as not within
the necessary scope of the Court's ruling, as the trial court conducted the
fact-finding and apparently had some doubts about Rojas's credibility.241
Justice Alito's dismissal of the possible coercion continues the trend of
courts ignoring all but the most outrageous police misconduct when
evaluating coercion. Despite the fact that the burden of proving freely
242given consent belongs to the prosecution, holdings such as Fernandez
suggest that here is in reality a de facto burden on the defense to prove
that the consent was coerced.
In addition to potential overt coercion, the Fernandez ruling ignores
the inherent coercion that is present in all consent-search encounters.243
After a traumatic experience in which she was apparently battered and
witnessed the arrest of her boyfriend, two presumably armed police of-
ficers returned to Rojas's apartment and requested a search.244 The Court
failed to consider the psychological state Rojas may have been in after
such an incident, especially when subsequently confronted by two au-
thority figures. Given the circumstances, it is likely Rojas felt she had no
choice but to consent. There is also no evidence that Rojas was aware of
237. Nancy Leong & Kira Suyeishi, Consent Forms and Consent Formalism, 2013 WIS L.
REV. 751, 778-79 & app. B. Interestingly enough, when police required defendants to sign consent
search forms in criminal cases, the defendant success rate fell to an even more futile 5%, compared
to a 9% success rate when no form was used. Id. For an in-depth discussion on the topic of consent
search forms and their impact on the rights of defendants, see generally id.
238. See Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1121.
239. Strauss, supra note 198, at 229.
240. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014) (No. 12-7822),
2013 WL 3972445, at *4 (internal quotation mark omitted).
241. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130 n.2.
242. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
243. See Strauss, supra note 198, at 236-40 (discussing the various studies demonstrating how
individuals will defer to authority figures); Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1115 (explaining how re-
quests from authority figures are often interpreted as demands).
244. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130.
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her right to refuse a search or aware that her consent to a search would
enable the police to prosecute her boyfriend for crimes unrelated to his
assault on her. Thinking that she had no other option but to acquiesce to
the police officer's request for a search, Rojas may have given in, think-
ing that the search would happen regardless of whether she consented.
Therefore, the "consent" that Rojas gave is likely no more than a legal
fiction. If the Court had applied the "totality of all the circumstances"
test, as required in Schneckloth,24 5 and further considered the inherent
confusion and fear present in many consent-search cases,246 it likely
would have reached a drastically different conclusion on whether Rojas
truly consented.
C. Fernandez Weakened the Already Inadequate Protections Against
Police Misconduct
In Fernandez, the Court loosened Randolph's already flimsy protec-
tions against police overreach by declaring that there need not be a sub-
jective inquiry into the intent of police officers removing an objector.247
Rather, the majority said that the officer's removal of an objector must
merely be "objectively reasonable."2 48 Even using a subjective standard,
the protections in Randolph were already a failure, as they sent "a signal
to police to move people as if they were pieces on a chessboard" in order
to avoid having to obtain a warrant.249 Because subjective intent is diffi-
cult to prove, Randolph fostered an environment in which it was advan-
tageous for the police to create an implicit policy of not asking for con-
sent so that a suspect could not object before the police had a chance to
obtain consent from a separate co-occupant instead.250 Therefore, Ran-
dolph sent a message to police that it was permissible to manipulate situ-
ations by separating individuals at the outset of an incident and then seek
permission for a search from the co-occupant whom the police believed
was the most likely to give it.2 5 1
Fernandez worsens incentives for police manipulation because it
not only gives the police an incentive to separate individuals, but also it
gives the police an incentive to arrest or detain objectors simply to re-
move them from the scene so that a search may be conducted based on
co-occupant consent. Given that Randolph's subjective inquiry protec-
tions were already inadequate, the complete elimination of an inquiry
245. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
246. See Sekhon, supra note 200, at 112.
247. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134.
248. Id.
249. Dery & Hernandez, supra note 2, at 55.
250. Id. at 82. For an in-depth discussion of an alternate view arguing that subjectivity is of
questionable utility in a Fourth Amendment analysis, see Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The
Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=2448617.
251. Dery & Hernandez, supra note 2 at 80, 82.
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into officer motivations in Fernandez makes the situation worse. As long
as the arrest or detention appears objectively reasonable, the warrantless
search is legitimate, even if the sole reason the police removed the objec-
tor was to avoid the need for a warrant.252 Professor Tracey Maclin pre-
dicted this exact scenario following the Randolph ruling in 2008, noting
how "an absent suspect's refusal to give consent will not be the final
word when the police can obtain the consent of the suspect's co-
occupant. And if necessary, the police can always remove or arrest a
suspect before seeking the co-occupant's consent."253 Fernandez en-
shrined Professor Maclin's fear into law by giving the police the ability
to overrule objectors by detaining or arresting them if there is a consent-
ing co-occupant present.
In Fernandez, the Court attempted to limit such abuses by creating
254the objective reasonableness tandard. However, the Court's limit will
protect objectors more in theory than in fact, as demonstrated by a survey
of cases that attempted to take advantage of Randolph's subjective pro-
tections since 2006.255 Even though the test moved from a subjective
examination of police motivations to an objective reasonableness test,
there is reason to believe that courts will still use the same tactics to dis-
miss defendant claims of consent-search discretion abuse. It may even be
easier for courts to dismiss Fernandez claims because now a court can
outright ignore evidence of police manipulation, as long as the police or
court can concoct any sort of "reasonable" reason for the objecting par-
ty's detention or arrest.256
In a 2008 survey of cases in which objectors sought the protection
of Randolph against police overreach, Professor Marc McAllister re-
viewed the various ways in which courts sought o side with the police in
a consent-search dispute.257 There is little reason to believe that these
legal trends will change simply because Fernandez shifted the standard
from a subjective to an objective one. For example, when applying the
Randolph test that looked into the subjective motivations of police offic-
ers, the courts gave defendants a difficult burden of proving police im-
25825propriety. In the 2006 case of United States v. Parker,259 the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals declined to extend Randolph protections to a
defendant because the precise circumstances surrounding the police ob-
taining a co-occupant consent search were unclear and the defendant
could not present concrete evidence of officer motivations in the rec-
252. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134.
253. Maclin, supra note 22, at 75-76 (footnote omitted).
254. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134.
255. See McAllister, supra note 6, at 668, 672-90 ("[P]ost-Randolph courts have developed at
least five ways to reject an otherwise legitimate Randolph claim . . . .").
256. See Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134 ("[T]he test is one of objective reasonableness . . .
257. See McAllister, supra note 6, at 668, 672-90.
258. Id at 668.
259. 469 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2006).
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ord.260 The court placed the burden of proving an unlawful removal on
the defendant and denied the defendant's Fourth Amendment claim de-
spite the fact that the police detained the defendant immediately upon
arriving on the scene to investigate a report of shots fired. 26 ' The defend-
ant in Parker never had an opportunity to object to a search because the
police immediately removed him from the scene. Because the court was
unwilling to extend Fourth Amendment protections to the Parker de-
fendant under the previous subjective test even given the defendant's
immediate removal, it is unlikely that courts will be any more sympathet-
ic to detained or arrested defendants who subsequently have their homes
searched under the new objective reasonableness test of Fernandez.
Even under the old subjective Randolph test, courts deferred to the
police to such an extent that officers could openly admit to intentionally
obtaining a consent search when the objector was not home with the pur-
pose of avoiding the need for a warrant.262 In the 2006 Pennsylvania case
of Commonwealth v. Yancoskie,263 the state court validated the search of
a defendant's house based on the consent of his wife, even though the
police admitted to planning their consent search around the fact that the
defendant was out of town.264 The state court reasoned that the defendant
assumed this risk-his wife letting the police search the premises-every
time he left the house.265 At its most absurd, this assumption-of-the-risk
reasoning would mean that every time a defendant left his house, the
police could intentionally bypass the warrant process by seeking a co-
occupant consent search. Essentially, under Fernandez and Randolph,
the Fourth Amendment protects a citizen only when they are physically
at home. Once a person steps outside or is otherwise removed from their
dwelling, the Fourth Amendment protection of their home evaporates.266
Applying the new Fernandez rule, the police could even plan arrests
to avoid the need for search warrants. For example, suppose the police
have an arrest warrant for a defendant for a minor infraction, such as
missing a court date for a public intoxication citation. The police also
suspect that the defendant is running a methamphetamine operation on
the side but do not have enough evidence to obtain a search warrant from
a judge. Under the tests and logic of Fernandez and Randolph, the police
could knock on the defendant's door, immediately arrest him on his fail-
ure-to-appear warrant, and then seek consent to search the house from
another occupant. Under Fernandez, it would be completely irrelevant
whether the defendant objected to the search when the police arrived at
260. McAllister, supra note 6, at 672-73 (summarizing Parker, 469 F.3d 1074).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 682-83 (summarizing Commonwealth v. Yancoskie, 915 A.2d Ill (Pa. Super. Ct.
2006)).
263. 915 A.2d III (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
264. McAllister, supra note 6, at 682.
265. Id.
266. Dery & Hernandez, supra note 2, at 55, 80.
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his house. This is despite the fact that the only reason the police aggres-
sively pursued the failure-to-appear warrant for a minor infraction was
that they wished to arrest the defendant in order to search his house for
more serious infractions. Surely, under Randolph's reasonableness test,
the defendant's arrest was reasonable because he had an actual outstand-
ing warrant.267 Yet, the entire purpose of the arrest was not to bring the
defendant to justice for his failure to appear, but to conduct a warrantless
consent search of his house. It cannot be that the Framers, who likely
envisioned the Fourth Amendment as protecting a citizen's right to pri-
vacy and "right to be let alone," would condone such unchecked police
search powers.268
D. A Possible Solution?
Although a complete analysis of the fixing the problems created by
co-occupant consent searches i outside the scope of this Comment, there
is a solution to the perverse incentives and violation of the Framer's in-
tentions created by Fernandez, and that solution is simply requiring a
search warrant once any occupant, present or not, objects to a search.269
The dissenting opinion in Fernandez suggested this approach.270 Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan noted that in a world of modem elec-
tronic communications, search warrants are as quick and effortless to
27 1obtain as they have ever been, and that if police officers have a legiti-
mate need to collect evidence, a warrant will easily overcome any de-
fendant's objections.272 This approach also comports with the views of
the Framers, who "saw the neutral magistrate as an essential part of the
criminal process."273
Some may object that eliminating consent searches by requiring
warrants will hinder an innocent co-occupant's ability to work with law
274enforcement. However, even an innocent person who may feel com-
pelled to work with the police experiences an invasion of their privacy
during a consent search.275 For example, in the process of searching a
common household, the police may uncover many completely legal, yet
highly personal items, such as material related to an individual's sex life
or medical conditions.27 6 Such items, although legal, may be a source of
significant embarrassment o both the suspect and the consenting co-
267. See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1134 (2014) (declaring that a defendant is
not protected when under a "lawful detention or arrest").
268. Maclin, supra note 22, at 39-40 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
269. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1142.
272. Id. at 1141.
273. Id. at 1143.
274. See Burkoff, supra note 196, at 1125.
275. Id.
276. Id at 1126.
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occupant, who only allowed a search to begin with out of an implied
obligation to help the police.2 77 Additionally, consent searches, while
convenient for the police, unnecessarily create significant "delay and
inconvenience" for those who are being searched, often out of the mere
sense that a search could not be refused.278
Furthermore, eliminating co-occupant consent searches would not
significantly hinder the ability of the police to investigate crimes as some
fear.27 9 Because the police often utilize consent searches when they
would have the necessary probable cause to search via a warrant anyway,
consent searches often only save the police the actual and arguably min-
imal hassle of obtaining a warrant.280 This means that often the only
damage that the police and society would suffer from eliminating consent
searches is that the police and the judiciary have to spend more time and
energy on paperwork.28 1 Therefore, in the majority of cases, eliminating
consent searches would not result in the apprehension of fewer criminals,
but would simply ensure that the police follow proper procedure when
investigating crimes.282 Additionally, in the event there is no time to get a
warrant, the current exigency exceptions that the Court has carved out
would give the police the ability to conduct a search anyways, as long as
there is probable cause.283
CONCLUSION
With the Fernandez decision, the Supreme Court continued its trend
of eroding Fourth Amendment protections in co-occupant consent
searches. Both Fernandez and Randolph create perverse incentives for
the police to manipulate situations and people for the purposes of avoid-
ing the need for a search warrant. If they desire, the police may now plan
arrests so as to immediately remove an objector from the scene and ob-
tain consent to search a residence from a third-party to avoid a warrant.
The subjective motivations of the police will not be examined even if the
police are consciously trying to manipulate the need for a warrant. When
officers arrest an objecting suspect, remove him from the scene, and
conduct a search based on third-party consent, courts may only review
the objective reasonableness of the arrest.
277. Id
278. Id.
279. See Strauss, supra note 198, at 260 (discussing how similar fears of an ineffective police
force never materialized following the implementation of Miranda rights).
280. Id. at 261, 263 (contending that the police are often able to obtain the same information
that is obtained in a consent search through more traditional investigatory techniques and thorough
police work as well).
281. Id. at 261.
282. Id
283. Strauss, supra note 198, at 261. For example, exigency exceptions to the warrant require-
ment can include when police need to enter a residence immediately to prevent the destruction of
evidence. See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011).
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The resulting situations of warrantless searches violate the spirit and
intent of the Fourth Amendment, which the Framers created to guarantee
all citizens a degree of privacy and place reasonable restrictions on po-
lice power. Justice Frankfurter once proclaimed that it is illogical to think
the Constitution was "meant to make it legally advantageous not to have
a warrant,"284 yet that is the scenario the Fernandez Court created, put-
ting the exact kind of discretion in the hands of law enforcement that the
nation's Founding Fathers feared.
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